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Government initiatives such as the Troubled Families Programme present a difficult 
problem for social scientists: how to discuss the policies without accepting and 
appearing to legitimise the problematic framing of social problems that they embody. 
The programme is characteristically neoliberal in its silence on structural inequality 
and in its targeting of certain families as deficient and wholly responsible for their 
situation. Like so many such programmes, its primary addressee is arguably not 
merely those targeted by the policies but the wider electorate. The paper discusses 
the dilemmas of challenging the policy’s framing. First it makes some general points 
about the different characters of political and academic discourses, before examining 
some key features of the framing of TFP,  its conceptualisation of social causes of 
problems and individual responsibility, and how social scientists might respond. It 
then draws upon the work of George Lakoff to comment on how the impact of policy 
and political discourse depends on the kinds of value systems it invokes, before 
concluding. 
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Introduction 
Government initiatives such as the Troubled Families Programme (TFP) present a 
difficult problem for social scientists: how to discuss such policies without accepting 
and appearing to legitimise the problematic framing of social problems that they 
embody and depend on. The programme is characteristically neoliberal in its silence 
on structural inequality and in its targeting of people as deficient and wholly 
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responsible for their situation. Radicals are likely to want to repudiate the programme 
and to reject its blaming of individuals and families, but in so doing they expose 
themselves to accusations of denying facts of anti-social behaviour and of idealising 
the targeted groups. Further, given that there is not a simple deterministic relation 
between social disadvantage and anti-social behaviour, one cannot adequately 
explain the latter wholly in terms of the former. Yet poverty and inequality tend not to 
be ennobling. Rather than deny that any problematic behaviour can be due to injuries 
of class, we need to frame it in a way that acknowledges both the behaviour and the 
more complex causality that produces it. We also need to take account of the fact 
that any policy is also addressed to advancing its authors’ wider political strategy.  
In order to discuss how social researchers might respond to TFP, the paper 
first makes some general comments about political discourse, its character, its 
intended audiences, its relation to other discourses, and the significance of how 
issues are framed in social policy. Second, it looks at TFP in the light of these points 
and in relation to neoliberal politics, and assesses various critical responses to it from 
social science. Third, it draws on the work of George Lakoff on framing and value 
systems in political discourse, which suggests how to challenge neoliberal welfare 
policies such as TFP in ways that are likely to resonate with the public. 
 
<A>Discourse, framing and audiences 
<FO>It would be naïve to assume that TFP was simply aimed at the particular 
families it identified, as if it were merely a neutral managerial response to problems 
whose definition was uncontroversial. Any social research that assumed this would 
be doomed to misunderstand its object, though it would make it easier for its authors 
to get a hearing from politicians. Social policies are not simply ways of dealing with 
alleged problems, but are always also – and sometimes more so – ways of 
advancing broader political strategies and worldviews, and gaining political support. 
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Indeed, the electorate, reached via the news media, is arguably often the primary 
addressee. 
The discourse of any particular policy or programme must therefore be 
understood not on its own but in its political context, both in terms of its origins and 
its intended audiences and effects. Such discourse overlaps with other kinds of 
discourses, including those of political speeches, broadsheet and tabloid 
newspapers, television news and the internet. As few members of the public read 
policy documents, their message is intended to be relayed through these other 
media, albeit it in their respective genres.1 
Political discourse, especially regarding topics of popular concern, is 
predominantly eristic – that is, conducted in order to gain victory over opponents and 
persuade others by any means that works, regardless of whether the arguments are 
logical or illogical, empirically supported or not. It is driven by self-interest rather than 
a desire to find the best accounts, explanations, and courses of action, and it is 
characteristically impatient (Sayer, 2008). By contrast, in an ideal kind of discussion, 
or in an ‘ideal speech situation’, as Habermas termed it, the only motive would be 
that of finding the better argument, and participants would be willing to take time to 
consider others’ ideas and change their minds if they proved superior (Habermas, 
1979). Academic discourse aspires to this ‘disinterested’ form of argument, though of 
course it often falls short of the ideal. Hence, whereas academic discourse generally 
seeks to remove ambiguity, political discourse often exploits it, as is unusually clear 
in the very term ‘troubled families’. 
At the same time, we have to recognise that in everyday life, in contrast to 
(ideal) academic discourse, the persuasiveness of particular political discourses 
depends heavily on how they play into implicit but powerful systems of value and 
emotion (Lakoff, 2004). Thus, social policies may sometimes be best understood as 
being partly intended to change or reinforce these wider feelings and prejudices as 
well as to address their target issue. I shall argue that this is the case for the TFP. 
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Finally, in assessing any social policy, it is always important to question the 
way in which it frames its topics: What is taken as given that might be questioned? 
What things are treated as parameters rather than variables? How does the definition 
and bounding of the problem limit diagnoses and prognoses? 
Much ‘policy science’ takes the goals and framing of policies as given and 
merely assesses ways of achieving those goals that are allowed within that framing. 
Different framings not only suggest different accounts and explanations, but different 
ways of assigning responsibility for problems and hence different allocations of 
blame or credit. They lead not merely to technical judgements about causes and 
what should be done but moral judgements of the behaviour of individuals and 
institutions. 
We can now look at the TFP with these points in mind. 
 
The framing of the Troubled Families Programme 
Recent policies such as TFP reflect the evolution of neoliberalism over the last four 
decades. Attacks on the welfare state, begun under the Thatcher and Major 
administrations and continued by New Labour, accused it of allowing its beneficiaries 
to avoid taking responsibility for their own actions and the consequences of these 
actions. Since the 2008 crash, the alleged necessity of austerity has been used to 
justify further welfare cuts. 
One of the key characteristics of neoliberal political discourse is its selective 
refusal of social, and especially economic, explanations of social problems. 
Thatcher’s hardline denial of the notion of society was later softened by 
communitarian influences under Blair and Cameron’s notion of ‘the Big Society’, but 
the evasion or denial of the effects of economic processes on life chances and 
behaviour has remained a constant. Individuals are thus held largely or wholly 
responsible for their fortunes. If their pasts have been difficult, they can and must 
take steps to free themselves from their pasts from now on. This individualistic 
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understanding of society fits well with commonsense thought. There are never job 
shortages, just under-motivated jobseekers who need to try harder to get work. 
There are never structural problems of poorly paid jobs, just individual workers who 
could be paid more if only they gained skills and worked harder. The fallacy of 
composition – that what is possible at certain times for some individuals must also be 
possible for all simultaneously – is a staple of neoliberal political discourse; zero-sum 
games cannot be acknowledged. Individuals are thus ‘responsibilised’ for dealing 
with problems that may originate elsewhere and which formerly might have been 
addressed by the welfare state (Shamir, 2008). 
This framing fits with the idea of a meritocratic society and what psychologist 
Melvin Lerner called the belief in a ‘just world’ – a world in which people largely get 
what they deserve, so that effort and merit are rewarded and their opposites 
penalised: people are paid what they are worth, and worth what they are paid 
(Lerner, 1981). In political discourse, it is often unclear whether concepts like 
meritocracy are meant to describe current society, predict a new world that lies 
ahead or prescribe one. Such ambiguity is useful. 
Although many social scientists emphasise structural causes of social 
problems, there is also a long history of social researchers lending support to what 
might be termed anti-poor policies, for example through notions of a ‘culture of 
poverty’, ‘welfare dependency’ or an ‘underclass’ (Murray, 1994: Welshman, 2006). 
Under neoliberalism, the influence of these latter researchers has grown, while those 
social scientific explanations which give considerable weight to social causes of 
individual characteristics and behaviour are viewed with suspicion both by 
neoliberals and the public as excusing individuals of any responsibility for their 
actions. But then, as we shall see, reconciling individual responsibility and social 
influences is no easy matter, and sociology in particular has often left little or no room 
for individual reflexivity and responsibility. 
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Over the last twenty years we have seen a gradual shift in social policy 
discourse from explanations for social problems that refer to history, backgrounds 
and social contexts, to ones which discount these, replacing understanding with 
moral judgement of individuals and correction of their behaviour. As former Prime 
Minister John Major once suggested, we should ‘condemn a little more and 
understand a little less’ (interview with the Mail on Sunday, 21 February 1993). This 
of course is emblematic of a shift in worldviews from Left to Right.  
The ‘responsibilisation’ strategy was clear in New Labour policy, though there 
are many historical precedents (Welshman, 2006). It involves a shift away from a 
rights-based view of welfare benefits to a more disciplinary, contractual view in which 
benefits are conditional on evidence of ‘responsible’ conduct, particularly being 
employed – hence ‘workfare’, and a corresponding shift of focus from needs to 
behaviour. TFP itself has its precedents in family policies pioneered by New Labour. 
In linking social policy to criminal and anti-social behaviour, it represents a 
criminalisation of social policy (Burney, 2005; Rodger, 2008). This was a risky 
strategy insofar as many Labour voters still regarded structural features as significant 
causes of social problems, and supported the notion of a welfare state that offsets 
these and provides a safety net. This is presumably why, even though New Labour’s 
social policies increasingly attempted to discipline individuals, this was described in 
policy documents as ‘support’. 
<EXT/> 
In 1997, this Government inherited a welfare state weighted heavily towards 
rewarding and supporting people who were not actively seeking to improve 
their situation, whether by looking for work or by taking part in training … Too 
many people lacked both the aspirations and the support to get back to work. 
(Gordon Brown, in DWP, 2008: 5) 
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Like Brown, only in stronger language, Cameron attributes an alleged decline 
in responsibility to the welfare state. 
For years we’ve had a system that encourages the worst in people – that 
incites laziness, that excuses bad behaviour, that erodes self-discipline, that 
discourages hard work …  above all that drains responsibility away from the 
people. (Cameron, 2011) 
But then the families are held responsible for a variety of social problems: 
For years we’ve known that a relatively small number of troubled families are 
responsible for a large proportion of the problems in our society. Maybe the 
parents have an addiction or have never worked in their life. Maybe there’s 
domestic violence. Often the children are completely out of control. 
(Cameron, 2010) 
 
In the TFP, the shift from social explanations to moral condemnation is 
matched by a heavier emphasis on discipline and punishment: 
families signing up to a contract that offered a mix of support and challenge to 
them [sic] with a new threat of sanction if families refused help. (DCLG, 2012: 
11) 
the threat of sanctions such as loss of tenancy ‘concentrates the mind’ of 
families and is a key mechanism for bringing about change. (DCLG, 2012: 28) 
 
On the face of it, the term ‘troubled families’ suggests they are beset by 
external problems, and are troubled in the sense of being anxious about or disturbed 
by certain things. While this could be construed as compassionate, it is clear from the 
above that it is nothing of the sort (Levitas, 2012a). Presumably, the government did 
not want to risk using a more inflammatory word like ’troublesome’ in official 
documents, and it could signal its intention in more informal and direct terms 
elsewhere, while relying on the tabloid press to elaborate the narrative and provide 
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graphic illustrations of ‘benefit cheats’ and the like for popular consumption. Further 
resonance was provided by a string of television programmes such as ‘Benefits 
Street’, ‘We pay your benefits’; ‘On benefits and proud’ (Jensen, 2014; Tyler, 2014 
that invited audiences to condemn and despise its subjects. Yet, it has to be 
acknowledged that such programmes – political and televisual – were popular, 
including among many who themselves benefitted from the support of the welfare 
state (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). The cheats, scroungers and skivers, were 
always other people, less deserving and supported by the long-suffering deserving 
majority. 
Explanations in terms of external circumstances such as local economic 
decline and lack of adequate jobs were conspicuously absent. A report published by 
Louise Casey, Director General of the TFP, called Listening to Troubled Families, 
contained not one mention of poverty. The title turned out to be another misnomer, in 
that the narratives of the selected families themselves were discounted, and 
peremptorily glossed with Casey’s own explanations: 
it was clear that the reasons for that behaviour had come from the household 
itself – the poor parenting skills, the constant changes in the home, family and 
partners, and the ongoing verbal and physical violence. (Casey, 2012: 59, 
cited in Bond-Taylor, 2015) 
As MacLehose comments, the families were defined by their behaviour, not by their 
experiences and situations (2014: 42–3). 
Yet while the misuse of evidence appealed to in TFP policy discourse to suit 
the political climate and strategy has been pointed out by experts on social policy 
(Levitas, 2012a; MacLehose, 2014), it does not follow from this that none of the 
pathologies that it claims to identify exists. One can analyse how the allegedly 
troubled families have been ‘constructed’ by the government and policy makers, but 
some of the anti-social behaviours – theft, physical and verbal abuse, child neglect – 
are real and serious; they cannot all be dismissed as tabloid inventions. 
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Consequently, opposing the stigmatisation and symbolic violence of the policy and 
media discourses by denying any culpability at the level of the individuals is 
problematic, and offensive to those who are victims of anti-social behaviour. Note 
too, that the denial of responsibility is typically selective: sociologists do not generally 
deny or ignore individual responsibility in cases of racism, rape or murder, nor do 
they treat them as products of (mis)labelling or negative social construction by the 
dominant. Further, while it is indeed important to stress social causes, analyses that 
leave no space for any individual responsibility, whether causal or moral, are 
problematic because they render people as helpless victims, having no agency. 
On the other hand, accounts of behavioural problems that allow a qualified 
role for individual responsibility are at risk of being claimed by the Right as support 
for their own unqualified, one-sidedly individualistic views, and painted by the Left as 
conceding the blaming and stigmatisation of the dominant discourse. Even to appear 
to step partly within the dominant frame is to risk being captured by it, or at least of 
being accused of it, though the risk may be lower in patient academic discourse than 
within more eristic, impatient debates. So strategically, within eristic debates, it may 
often be best simply ‘not to go there’, and talk instead about social causes of 
problems. This has been common amongst social researchers, and indeed generally 
I would recommend it on such occasions. But sooner or later one is likely to have to 
confront the individualistic accounts and acknowledge that some behaviour is 
seriously anti-social. It could take decades to change the broader social causes, and 
even then, given that dispositions acquired from early life are hard to change, one 
might not expect problematic behaviours to disappear quickly. 
A strategy of denying problematic behaviours underestimates the extent of 
injuries of class and other forms of inequality and confuses partisanship with critique. 
The case against it has been well made by Martha Nussbaum through the example 
of Joseph Steinbeck’s famous book, The Grapes of Wrath. In that story, the 
impoverished migrants face a succession of disasters, injustices and indignities, and 
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yet retain their dignity and generosity. Their moral qualities are undiminished, even 
strengthened by their experience, so the story easily wins our sympathy and co-opts 
our sense of injustice. But it is also a romantic conceit: 
 
Steinbeck gives the rich an easy time, really: for he shows that all injustice 
can produce is unhappiness. If we understand that injustice can strike its 
roots into the personality itself, producing rage and resentment and the roots 
of bad character, we have even deeper incentives to commit ourselves to 
giving each child the material and social support that human dignity requires. 
(Nussbaum, 2001: 414). 
 
Inequalities tend to injure people – that is mainly why they are so problematic 
(Sennett and Cobb, 1972; Sennett, 1998; Sayer, 2005). Poverty, insecurity, 
exclusion, stigmatisation and a depressed/ing environment make daily life extremely 
difficult and are not ennobling. Those difficulties do not necessarily lead to the 
pathologies highlighted in the TFP discourse: the relation is probabilistic rather than 
deterministic. And as Shildrick et al.’s empirical studies of families living in poor areas 
shows, they are not found in most such families (Shildrick et al., 2012).2 
Nevertheless, poverty and inequality can harm people in many ways, including 
causing stress and ill-health, making conflict more likely and reducing faith in 
legitimate ways of making a living (Charlesworth, 2000; Wacquant, 1999). In turn, 
anxiety and susceptibility to depression can reduce the ability to make rational 
decisions. Further, psychological research on altruistic behaviour shows how it is 
encouraged (discouraged) by good (bad) treatment and conditions that people 
experience (Appiah, 2008). Research on attachment in early life shows that neglect 
and abuse of children can make it hard for them to cope well in later life, and can 
cause behavioural problems that are difficult to change (Cassidy and Shriver, 1999). 
Note again the qualifiers – ‘are likely to’, ‘can’: there are often over-riding factors that 
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inhibit these pathologies, such as strong support networks of family and friends. 
There may also be strengths fostered by living with poverty and exclusion, such as 
resilience, toughness and experience of dealing with heavy responsibilities. 
A common response from the Right to claims that behavioural problems are 
substantially caused by poverty and inequality is that these do not justify anti-social 
behaviour and criminality. Hence, in eristic discourse, those who point to such 
conditions can easily be put on the defensive: ‘are you saying poverty justifies 
violence?’. The challenge confuses explanations of behaviour with justifications. 
Much behaviour lacks moral justification, but is nevertheless made more or less likely 
by particular circumstances. An under-regulated financial system does not justify 
irresponsible actions that risk crashing the economy, but causally it makes them 
likely. 
The intergenerational transmission of advantages and disadvantages is a 
further difficult issue to address in debates on social policy. The Right either ignores 
it as an inconvenient fact for narratives of social mobility and meritocracy, or 
selectively exaggerates it through references to a culture of poverty or alleged 
genetic inferiority or, more specifically, through claims that there are families that 
have not worked for three generations. Empirical research shows the latter not to be 
true, and that the typical pattern for the most disadvantaged families is to move in 
and out of work (Shildrick et al., 2012). In an eristic context, it can be difficult both to 
acknowledge that children are likely to take on the disadvantages of their parental 
context, and to counter politically motivated attempts to blame their parents’ 
approach to child-rearing. As Welshman shows, the history of social policy is littered 
with cases of folk beliefs about the poor that keep returning – usually in new guises – 
no matter how many times social research shows them not to be true (Welshman, 
2006). 
While TFP is clearly an example of ‘responsibilisation’, this concept also 
needs qualification. As is typical in the Foucauldian tradition, it is ‘crypto-normative’ 
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(Sayer, 2011); that is, the description sounds ominous and suggests something 
problematic, yet fails to explain why. Are all forms of responsibilisation problematic or 
only certain forms? After all, in their daily lives, Foucauldians, as much as anyone 
else, hold people responsible for certain actions. Responsibilisation is problematic 
where it expects individuals to resolve problems for which they cannot reasonably be 
held responsible, or correct effects of formative influences which are difficult to 
change. But it is not easy to distinguish what people can and cannot be expected to 
do, given their backgrounds and current situations, including existing opportunities 
and constraints. Just what in each case is reasonable to expect and what is too 
much is partly a practical question of what is feasible given constraints and available 
resources, and partly a normative matter of what people should be willing to do and 
what lengths they should go to in overcoming constraints and limitations.3 Punitive 
observers, such as Casey, attach little importance to such constraints. What can be 
said is that, other things equal, the greater the incidence of poverty, neglect, 
inequality, marginalisation and stigma, the less we should be surprised that 
behavioural problems will arise. However we might choose to judge the behaviours, 
their incidence is heavily influenced by social circumstances, and available ‘cultural 
toolkits’ for dealing with them (Swidler, 1986), so for practical as well as academic 
purposes, we need to understand more and condemn less. Neoliberal discourse 
systematically ignores these structural forces, but given the massive impact these 
have on individuals and families, any adequate response to policies like TFP must, 
above all, highlight them rather than remain with the narrow frame set by the official 
discourse or indeed that of the academic discipline of social policy. 
 
Value systems and framing in political discourse 
It is easy for academics, accustomed to prioritising reasoned analysis, to 
underestimate the extent to which the effectiveness of political discourse depends 
not on the adequacy of its arguments and evidence, but on how it plays into major 
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systems of values. To varying degrees, its authors know this. George Lakoff, the US 
cognitive linguist, argues that elections are decided primarily on values rather than 
policies, and that if progressives are to win against the Right, they need to realise 
this and stop arguing about policies within value frames set by their opponents, and 
argue instead from and for their own values (Lakoff, 2004). The Right, by contrast, 
seem to be aware that communicating general values favourable to their policies is 
more effective than explaining the policies themselves. 
Lakoff (2004) argues that the Republicans mobilise a frame of values 
involving a ‘strict father model’. This involves obedience to authority, self-discipline 
and self-reliance, patriarchal families and heteronormativity, respect for the wealthy 
as deserving and contempt for the dependent as undeserving, as in the just world 
ideal. Outsiders – anyone who is different – are regarded with suspicion and fear: 
conformity connotes morality. Empathy and compassion are associated with gullibility 
and weakness. In this model, conviction trumps reason: intellect is seen as 
redundant and dangerous, and those who need to appeal to evidence, arguments 
and experts are regarded as weak, ‘flip-flop’ people who do not know what they 
think.4 Explanations are already to hand, commonsense is authoritative and what is 
needed is firm action; the strong father always already knows what is right and will 
protect all those who put their trust in him. The more populist political discourse on 
TFP exemplifies this value framing. Insofar as official documents refer to empirical 
evidence, they do so in ways that support the policy and its value frame. 
Lakoff (2004) recommended that in political debate, rather than respond 
within this frame, ‘progressives’ (American left liberals) should use their own, 
‘nurturant parent model’ as an alternative; he claimed this would appeal to voters if 
characterised effectively. It has a more compassionate and generous view of others, 
is open to difference, values dignity and respect for all, and values reason and 
evidence over simple authority per se. Lakoff argues the two value frames involve 
different neural systems, and that while most people may operate with a mix of each, 
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the balance can be influenced by discourse and actions which reinforce one rather 
than the other. 
He also argues that conservatives tend to think in terms of simple, direct 
causation; if a child is neglected or abused by an alcoholic parent, then we need look 
no further for an explanation of this outcome and can proceed immediately to the 
solution: discipline to change behaviour. Progressives, by contrast, appeal to more 
inclusive, complex, systemic explanations, similar to those of sociology, which imply 
a wide range of measures to resolve the problem. While this means that in eristic 
discourse they have a more difficult task in having to make complex, qualified 
arguments persuasive, Lakoff (2004) argues that by mobilising vocabularies that 




I have argued that with greater awareness of the kinds of discourse and framings 
used in discussions of social policy, social scientists may be able to give more 
penetrating and effective evaluations of social policies and their reception, and 
possibly – bearing Lakoff’s points in mind – achieve more impact and resonance 
among the wider public.  
While being wary of the twin evils of stigmatising and idealising the poor, 
social scientists need to recognise that poverty is not ennobling; it can damage 
people and produce common pathologies. They are a key reason why poverty is so 
bad. The difficulty for social scientists is how to acknowledge that anti-social and self-
destructive behaviour does happen, while highlighting the structural features of 
society that produce poverty, inequality and insecurity. Although the symbolic 
violence directed against disadvantaged people in the TFP discourse must be 
challenged, it is not enough to oppose the programme merely in terms of 
stigmatisation and misrecognition, for these are more misguided responses to 
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disadvantages caused mainly by economic deprivation than primary causes of those 
disadvantages. Even without the blaming and responsibilisation of TFP and other 
‘workfare’ policies, those targeted by the programme would be disadvantaged. Part 
of the problem of social policy research and commentary is precisely that it tends to 
be limited to policies themselves and to allow deeper causes of social problems to 
remain hidden: other social scientists – political economists, for example, deal with 
many of these. In this paper, I have tried to indicate how social researchers 
responding to programmes like TFP need to find ways of acknowledging and 
communicating the complex causality behind the problems the policies address, 
while remaining vigilant about the risks of involvement in eristic debates about 
politically sensitive issues and adopting appropriate strategies for navigating them.  
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Notes 
1 In critical discourse analysis this is known as a ‘genre chain’ (Fairclough, 
2003). 
2 Notwithstanding the TFP’s misuse of data on multiple deprivation as a 
measure of anti-social behaviour (Levitas, 2012a and b), deprivation makes the latter 
more likely to occur. 
3 In political philosophy, particularly following Rawls’ Theory of Justice, it has 
become common to see motivation itself as significantly affected by social 
circumstances and types of upbringing, so that individuals are not held substantially 
responsible for motivation (Rawls, 1971). 
4 John Kerry was called this by Republicans for his habit of defending policies 
in this way (Lakoff, 2004). 
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